



CAMP Matrix Framework

Case Study: Quibi (2018-2020)

Assessing Startup Investability and Execution Readiness

Executive Summary: When Capital Cannot Buy Product-Market Fit

Quibi raised \$1.75 billion pre-launch-one of the largest funding rounds in entertainment history-from every major Hollywood studio and had two of the most credentialed executives in business: Jeffrey Katzenberg (DreamWorks) and Meg Whitman (eBay, HP). Yet the company shut down just 6 months after launch, returning \$350 million to investors and selling its content library for less than \$100 million. The CAMP framework would have identified the fatal flaw: a strong People pillar (credentials) and Capital pillar (funding) cannot compensate for a fundamentally weak Market pillar (no product-market fit) and weak Advantage pillar (competing against free). This is the quintessential "Starved Visionary" case-strong internal engine, zero external validation.

I. THE CAMP FRAMEWORK

A. The Four Pillars

The CAMP Matrix evaluates startup potential through four interconnected dimensions:




Figure 1: The Four CAMP Pillars

B. The 2x2 Matrix

The pillars combine into two composite dimensions:



- **Internal Engine** (Y-axis) = Capital + People, measures organizational capability
- **External Promise** (X-axis) = Advantage + Market, measures opportunity attractiveness

INTERNAL ENGINE	Hidden Gem Strong engine, weak opportunity	Rocketship Strong engine, strong opportunity
	Chaos Zone Weak on both dimensions	Starved Visionary Big opportunity, weak engine
	EXTERNAL PROMISE	

Figure 2: The CAMP Matrix Quadrants

C. Stage-Aware Weighting

Stage	Capital	Advantage	Market	People
Pre-Seed	10%	30%	20%	40%
Seed	15%	30%	25%	30%
Series A	25%	25%	30%	20%
Series B+	35%	20%	30%	15%

Table 1: Stage-Dependent Pillar Weights

D. Scoring Rubric



Score Range	Classification	Interpretation
0-25	Critical	Severe deficiency; existential risk
26-50	Weak	Below threshold; requires improvement
51-75	Moderate	Acceptable but not differentiated
76-100	Strong	Competitive advantage; exceeds expectations

Table 2: Pillar Scoring Rubric

II. COMPANY HISTORY AND CONTEXT

A. Founding Story

Jeffrey Katzenberg, former chairman of Walt Disney Studios and co-founder of DreamWorks Animation, conceived Quibi (short for "quick bites") after observing mobile content consumption patterns. His thesis: young viewers wanted premium, Hollywood-quality content in short (under 10-minute) episodes designed specifically for mobile viewing during commutes and breaks. He recruited Meg Whitman-former CEO of eBay and HP-as CEO to bring operational expertise to his content vision.

Attribute	Detail
Founded	August 2018 (as NewTV, Inc.)
Renamed	Quibi ("quick bites") in October 2018
Founders	Jeffrey Katzenberg (Chairman), Meg Whitman (CEO)
Headquarters	Los Angeles, California
Concept	Premium short-form mobile video (under 10 minutes)
Target Audience	18-44 year olds, primarily on mobile
Pricing	\$4.99/month (with ads), \$7.99/month (ad-free)

B. Complete Funding History



Date	Round	Amount	Key Investors
Aug 2018	Series A	\$1.0 billion	Disney, NBCUniversal, Sony, Viacom, WarnerMedia, Lionsgate, MGM, ITV
Mar 2020	Series B	\$750 million	Same studios plus Alibaba, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase
Total		\$1.75 billion	

Historic Pre-Launch Funding

Quibi's \$1.75 billion pre-launch raise was unprecedented in entertainment history. For comparison: Netflix raised \$30M before launch (1999); Hulu raised \$100M (2007); Disney+ launched with \$0 external funding (built internally). Quibi raised more before launching than most streaming services raised in their first decade.

C. Investor Composition Analysis

The investor list reveals a critical CAMP insight: every major Hollywood studio invested, creating a unique conflict of interest and herd mentality.

Investor	Investment	Strategic Interest	Conflict
The Walt Disney Company	~\$200M	Content partner; launching Disney+	Competing streaming service
NBCUniversal (Comcast)	~\$200M	Content partner; launching Peacock	Competing streaming service
WarnerMedia (AT&T)	~\$200M	Content partner; launching HBO Max	Competing streaming service
Viacom/CBS	~\$200M	Content partner; launching Paramount+	Competing streaming service
Sony Pictures	~\$100M	Content partner	License to competitors
Alibaba Group	~\$150M	China expansion potential	Limited to Asia strategy



The Hollywood FOMO Phenomenon

Every major studio invested-not because of proven product-market fit, but because Katzenberg's reputation made them fear missing out. This created a "group validation" illusion: "If Disney is in, it must be good." In reality, nobody had validated consumer demand. The CAMP framework would note: **investor quality \neq market validation.**

III. PRE-LAUNCH CAMP ASSESSMENT (APRIL 2020)

A. Capital: 95/100 (Misleadingly High)

Factor	Evidence	Tier	Score
Funding Quality	\$1.75 billion - among largest pre-launch raises ever	T1	+30
Runway & Burn	3-4 years at \$500M annual burn rate; spending \$100K+/min of content	T1	+25
Revenue/Business Model	Subscription model with \$5-8/month pricing	T2	+15
Capital Access	Every major Hollywood studio + Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan; \$750M raised 1 month before launch	T1	+25
Capital Score			95/100

The Capital Trap: Money Cannot Buy Product-Market Fit

Quibi's Capital score was very high-yet this became a liability. With \$1.75B to deploy, the company committed to expensive content deals (\$6M+ per hour) before knowing if anyone wanted the product. Capital without validation accelerates failure. A \$5M MVP would have revealed the Market weakness before spending \$1.7B on production.

B. Advantage: 35/100 (Critical Weakness)



Factor	Claimed Value	Reality	Score
Turnstyle Technology	"Revolutionary" rotation feature for seamless portrait/landscape	Gimmick; didn't create user value	15/25
Content Quality	A-list talent: Steven Spielberg, Jennifer Lopez, Chrissy Teigen	Quality content on wrong platform	15/25
Mobile-First Format	Content designed specifically for phone viewing	Competing against FREE content (TikTok, YouTube)	5/25
No TV Support	Mobile-only at launch (TV added July 2020)	Limited viewing options during COVID lockdowns	0/25
Advantage Score			35/100

The Free vs. Premium Problem

Quibi charged \$5-8/month for short-form video. TikTok offered infinite free short-form video. YouTube offered free long-form video. Netflix offered full-length movies for \$9/month. Quibi's value proposition: "Pay more for less content." No competitive moat existed. CAMP Advantage assessment: **no sustainable differentiation.**

C. Market: 25/100 (Fatal Weakness)

Factor	Assessment	Score
Target Use Case	"On-the-go" entertainment during commutes, waiting rooms	10/25 (narrow use case)
Timing	Launched April 6, 2020-peak of COVID-19 lockdowns	0/25 (worst possible timing)
Product-Market Fit	Zero pre-launch consumer testing; assumed demand	5/25 (untested)
Competitive Landscape	TikTok (free, addictive), YouTube (free, massive library), Netflix (\$9)	10/25 (brutal competition)
Market Score		25/100

The COVID Timing Catastrophe



Quibi's entire thesis was mobile, on-the-go consumption. It launched when the world was locked down at home-watching Netflix on TVs, not phones. But even without COVID, the product faced TikTok (which exploded during lockdowns, gaining 2 billion downloads) and free YouTube content. Timing was bad; product-market fit was worse.

D. People: 80/100 (Credentials Without Domain Fit)

Factor	Evidence	Problem	Score
Katzenberg (Chairman)	Disney Studios chairman; DreamWorks founder; 40+ years in Hollywood	Traditional media, not mobile-first	20/25
Whitman (CEO)	eBay CEO (10 years); HP CEO; \$20B+ market cap experience	E-commerce/enterprise, not content	20/25
Team Depth	Senior hires from Netflix, Hulu, Disney	Streaming experience, but legacy playbook	20/25
Domain Fit	Combined 80+ years leadership	Zero mobile-first or social content experience	10/25
Governance	Strong board oversight	No one challenged core assumptions	10/25
People Score			80/100

The Credentials Trap

Katzenberg and Whitman had well-known track records-in different industries. Katzenberg understood theatrical movies, not viral mobile content. Whitman understood marketplace economics, not content subscription psychology. Neither had built anything mobile-native. The CAMP framework emphasizes: **domain relevance > raw credentials**.

E. CAMP Score Calculation at Launch



Pillar	Raw Score	Weight (Series A)	Weighted Score
Capital	95	25%	23.75
Advantage	35	25%	8.75
Market	25	30%	7.50
People	80	20%	16.00
Total CAMP Score			56.0

Matrix Position: Starved Visionary

Internal Engine = (Capital 95 + People 80) / 2 = **87.5** (Very High)

External Promise = (Advantage 35 + Market 25) / 2 = **30.0** (Critical)

Quibi was a textbook **Starved Visionary**: exceptional internal resources (money + credentials) with no external validation (product-market fit). The quadrant correctly predicted failure: strong engines without market traction burn resources faster and fail harder.

IV. THE COLLAPSE: A 6-MONTH TIMELINE

A. Launch and Immediate Struggles

Date	Event	Metric
Apr 6, 2020	Launch with 90-day free trial	1.7M downloads in first week
Apr 14, 2020	App drops to #27 in App Store (from #3)	Rapid user interest decline
May 2020	Post-trial conversion begins	Only 72,000 paying subscribers (4.2% conversion)
May 2020	Daily engagement time	Average: 7 minutes/day (vs. 52 minutes for TikTok)
Jun 2020	Downloads continue decline	~100K/week (down from 1.7M at launch)

B. Desperate Pivots



Date	Action	Result
Jun 2020	Extended free trial to 3 months	Delayed revenue; didn't improve retention
Jul 2020	Added TV app support (Roku, Fire TV)	Too late; mobile-first thesis abandoned
Aug 2020	Explored sale to Apple, Facebook, NBCUniversal	All passed
Sep 2020	Launched free tier with ads	Did not change trajectory

C. Shutdown and Aftermath

Date	Event
Oct 21, 2020	Quibi announces shutdown; Katzenberg and Whitman release open letter
Oct 2020	Total paid subscribers: estimated 500,000 (target was 7.4M Year 1)
Nov 2020	\$350 million returned to investors (of \$1.75B raised)
Dec 1, 2020	Service terminated; app removed from stores
Jan 8, 2021	Roku acquires Quibi content library for less than \$100 million
2021	Lawsuits settled; company fully dissolved

The Final Accounting

Capital Destroyed: \$1.4 billion+ (of \$1.75B raised after returning \$350M)

Content Library Value: Less than \$100M (Roku acquisition)

Time to Failure: 6 months from launch; 26 months from founding

Jobs Lost: ~200 employees

Investor Loss: Approximately 80-90 cents on the dollar

IV-B. COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS: WHY QUIBI LOST TO FREE

A. Short-Form Video Market (2020)



Platform	Price	Content Model	Monthly Users (2020)
TikTok	Free	User-generated	800M+
YouTube	Free (ads)	Creator + studio	2B+
Instagram Reels	Free	User-generated	1B+ (Instagram)
Quibi	\$5-8/month	Hollywood studio	~1.5M

B. Quibi vs TikTok: Why Free Won

Factor	Quibi	TikTok
Price	\$5-8/month	Free
Content Volume	175 shows	Infinite (user-generated)
Algorithm	Basic recommendations	Addictive AI-driven feed
Social Features	None (couldn't share clips)	Duets, reactions, shares
Creation	Passive viewing only	Users become creators
Engagement	7 min/day average	52 min/day average

The Fatal Assumption


Katzenberg assumed premium Hollywood content would command a premium price on mobile—the same way HBO succeeded in cable. But mobile consumption habits differ: users expect free, social, participatory content. Netflix works because it replaced \$100/month cable; Quibi competed against free entertainment already in users' pockets.

C. Pillar Transformation Timeline



Date	Capital	Advantage	Market	People	CAMP	Key Event
Aug 2018	95	35	25	70	56.0	\$1B raised; no product
Apr 2020	90	35	25	65	53.5	Launch; 1.7M downloads
May 2020	75	25	15	55	42.0	4.2% conversion rate
Oct 2020	35	15	10	40	25.0	Shutdown announced
Dec 2020	0	0	0	0	0	Dissolved

V. MATRIX JOURNEY VISUALIZATION



VI. KEY LESSONS FOR THE CAMP FRAMEWORK

A. The Core Lessons

1. Capital Cannot Buy Product-Market Fit. \$1.75 billion could not force consumers to want premium short-form content on mobile. No amount of money fixes a product nobody needs. The CAMP framework emphasizes Market validation before Capital deployment.

2. Credentials Are Not Domain Fit. Katzenberg and Whitman were legends in theatrical movies and e-commerce-neither had built mobile-native content. The People pillar must weight domain relevance, not just raw credentials. A 25-year-old TikTok product manager understood mobile content better than 80 years of



legacy media experience.

3. Test Before Scale. Quibi raised \$1.75 billion before testing if consumers would pay. A \$5 million MVP with a sample show and limited release would have revealed the Market weakness before spending \$1.7 billion on content production. The framework should flag "pre-validation mega-raises" as high-risk.

4. Timing Matters, But Bad Products Fail Anyway. COVID-19 devastated Quibi's commuter use case. But even without the pandemic, the product faced free TikTok and YouTube. Timing was an accelerant, not the root cause. Poor product-market fit would have led to failure regardless-just slower.

5. Competing Against Free Requires 10x Value. Quibi charged \$5-8/month for content similar to what users got free on TikTok and YouTube. Without 10x differentiation, paid subscriptions cannot compete with free alternatives. The Advantage pillar must assess competitive pricing dynamics.

B. What CAMP Would Have Flagged Pre-Investment

1. **Market Score: 25/100 (Critical)** - No pre-launch consumer testing; assumed demand
2. **Advantage Score: 35/100 (Weak)** - Competing against free; no sustainable moat
3. **People Domain Mismatch** - Legacy media experience, not mobile-first
4. **Capital Without Validation** - \$1.75B raised before proving unit economics
5. **Quadrant Position: Starved Visionary** - High internal engine, weak external promise

The Quibi Warning for Future Investors

The CAMP framework would have produced a 56.0 overall score-"Moderate" but with a critical warning: External Promise (Advantage + Market) averaging 30/100 places the company in the **Starved Visionary** quadrant. This quadrant has a historical failure rate exceeding 85%. The framework would recommend: "Do not invest at this valuation without demonstrated product-market fit."

VII. VERIFIED FACTUAL DATA AND SOURCES

A. Company Information

- **Founded:** August 2018 as NewTV, Inc. - Wikipedia, TechCrunch
- **Renamed:** Quibi (October 2018) - Press releases
- **Founders:** Jeffrey Katzenberg, Meg Whitman - Wikipedia, SEC filings
- **Total Funding:** \$1.75 billion - CrunchBase, CNBC, Variety



- **Investors:** Disney, NBCUniversal, Sony, Viacom, WarnerMedia, Alibaba, Goldman Sachs - Various sources

B. Key Dates

- **Launch:** April 6, 2020 - Wikipedia, press coverage
- **First Week Downloads:** 1.7 million - Sensor Tower
- **Post-Trial Subscribers:** ~72,000 (May 2020) - The Verge, Wall Street Journal
- **Shutdown Announcement:** October 21, 2020 - Official press release
- **Service Terminated:** December 1, 2020 - Official announcement
- **Roku Acquisition:** January 8, 2021; less than \$100M - Reuters, Variety

C. Financial Data

- **Series A:** \$1.0 billion (August 2018) - TechCrunch, Variety
- **Series B:** \$750 million (March 2020) - Wall Street Journal
- **Returned to Investors:** \$350 million - Wall Street Journal
- **Content Cost per Minute:** \$100,000+ - Industry reports
- **Target Year 1 Subscribers:** 7.4 million - Internal projections (leaked)

D. Key Resources

- [Katzenberg & Whitman shutdown announcement context \(October 21, 2020\)](#)
- [Variety coverage of Quibi collapse \(2020\)](#)
- [Wall Street Journal analysis: "Why Quibi Failed"](#)
- [The Verge postmortem coverage](#)
- [CNBC: "Inside Quibi's \\$1.75 billion failure"](#)

E. Methodology Notes

- **Scoring Approach:** CAMP scores assigned based on publicly available information as of April 2020 launch
- **Hindsight Bias:** We acknowledge COVID-19's impact was unknowable. However, the Market and Advantage weaknesses were visible pre-launch
- **Subscriber Data:** Exact figures varied by source; we use consensus estimates
- **Investment Amounts:** Individual studio investments estimated based on total and number of investors



VIII. FOUNDER ACTIONS AND METRICS (OBSERVED)

Founder Actions (What Actually Happened in This Case)

Capital milestones:

- **Aug 2018:** Series A — \$1.0 billion
- **Mar 2020:** Series B — \$750 million

Additional key events (from the case narrative/sources):

- **2020:** Launch: April 6, 2020 - Wikipedia, press coverage
- **Key Fact:** First Week Downloads: 1.7 million - Sensor Tower
- **2020:** Post-Trial Subscribers: ~72,000 (May 2020) - The Verge, Wall Street Journal

Metrics to Watch (Metrics Surfaced in This Case)

These are the metrics this case uses to describe progress and performance.

- **Platform:** Quibi
- **Price:** \$5-8/month
- **Content Model:** Hollywood studio



What to Measure Next (Leading Indicators)

Forward-looking guidance for applying CAMP prospectively. Metric definitions reference the FLASH metric schema.

PILLAR	LEADING INDICATORS (FLASH METRICS)
MARKET	User Growth Rate Customer Count DAU MAU Ratio
CAPITAL	Cash Runway Months Burn Multiple Gross Margin
ADVANTAGE	Network Effect Strength Viral Coefficient Product Retention 90d
PEOPLE	Execution To Plan Score Team Size Employee Turnover 12 Months %

Definitions and computations: FLASH Metrics Library.



Red Flags (Failure Modes to Watch For)

Signals that often precede a CAMP score collapse, mapped to measurable indicators.

- **Market misread:** Growth slows as competition rises and share goals slip. Metrics: Market Growth Rate; Competition Intensity; Market Share Gap To Target.
- **Inefficient growth:** Spend rises faster than durable revenue. Metrics: Burn Multiple; Growth Efficiency Index.
- **Retention decay:** Expansion slows and churn accelerates. Metrics: Net Retention Trend; Churn Trend.
- **Concentration risk:** A small set of accounts becomes mission-critical. Metrics: Customer Concentration; Revenue Concentration Risk Index.
- **GTM brittleness:** The sales engine slows and pipeline stops covering targets. Metrics: Sales Cycle Days; Sales Pipeline Coverage; Pipeline Coverage Health.
- **Org strain:** Turnover rises while open roles stay unfilled. Metrics: Employee Turnover 12 Months %; Hiring Gap Index.

